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Explanation and Legal Theory
Brian Leiter*
I am not going to say much about the most interesting new argument
developed in the article that is the premise of this Symposium': namely,
that the moral value of integrity does not justify appeal to legal principles
when these principles are otherwise morally sub-optimal.2 The argument
seems to falter on the largely tacit, but false, assumption that there are no
significant epistemic limitations on determining moral optimality. Other
participants in this Symposium, however, will have more to say about this. I
want to concentrate, instead, on the philosophical posture that informs the
Essay, and what it might mean for legal theory.
On the very first page of Against Legal Principles,3 Larry Alexander and
Ken Kress attempt to situate their attack on "legal principles" within a
broadly naturalistic philosophical program, one that seeks to purge from
our best picture of the world those properties and events that do no
explanatory work. Thus, Alexander and Kress write:
Just as the nineteenth-century physicists invoked the ether to
explain past observations and predict future ones, traditional legal
reasoning and theories of interpretation invoke legal principles to
explain the outcomes in past cases and to justify conclusions
about how future cases should be decided. And like the
invocation of the ether, the invocation of legal principles is
misguided.4
Although there is much to be said in favor of honoring naturalistic
scruples,. this appealing analogy strikes me as being, nonetheless,
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publication.
1. Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in Law and Interpretation:
Essays in Legal Philosophy 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739
(1997).
2. There are other interesting, but not new, arguments revisited in this Essay, including,
for example, Kress's seminal discussion of the problem of retroactivity in Dworkin's theory. See
Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and
the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369 (1984). There are also, I think, other new, but
less interesting, arguments which other contributors to this Symposium will take up.
3. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 279, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 739 (1997).
4. Id.
5. In particular, naturalistic scruples constitute our best defense against a promiscuous,
pre-Enlightenment ontology-as is readily apparent from the work of philosophers who too
readily disparage such scruples, such as John McDowell and Hilary Putnam. See John
McDowell, Mind and World (1994); Hilary Putnam, Are Moral and Legal Values Made or
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wrongheaded in the case at hand. To start, as I read it, the paper by
Alexander and Kress is actually devoid of any arguments against the
existence of legal principles, and consists entirely of normative arguments
against employing legal principles in either legal reasoning or
jurisprudential theories about legal reasoning. Indeed, much later on,
Alexander and Kress concede as much-though, strangely, they bury the
point in a footnote.6 But to concede this point is to vitiate utterly the force
of the analogy: ether was dropped from our best naturalistic picture of the
world precisely because it did no explanatory work, not because it was
normatively sub-optimal.7
The analogy breaks down at an even deeper and more illuminating
level. We may see this if we recall the precise language Alexander and
Kress employ in sketching the analogy: Ether, they write, served "to explain
past observations and predict future ones" while legal principles serve "to
explain the outcomes in past cases and to justify conclusions about how
future cases should be decided."8
Notice the subtle, but significant, shift in language: ether was invoked
to "explain" the past and "predict" the future, while legal principles are
invoked to "explain" the past but "justify" the future. But plainly
Discovered?, 1 Legal Theory 5 (1995); Hilary Putnam, Replies, 1 Legal Theory 69 (1995). In the
latter piece, Putnam wrongly calls me a "scientific imperialist" for insisting that naturalistic
scruples about explanatory power be brought to bear on values. Replies, supra, at 70. For my
original argument, that provoked Putnam's accusation, see Brian Leiter, The Middle Way, 1
Legal Theory 21 (1995). "Imperialism," however, implies an unjustified and wrongful
extension of hegemony. Yet Putnam gives no account of why such scruples are misplaced in
the evaluative context (except for the facile, but mistaken, argument that such a naturalistic
position is incoherent because of its being predicated upon epistemic values). Following
Quine, I take the justification for naturalism to be thoroughly pragmatic: naturalistic
norms-like the norm demanding explanatory power-have simply worked the best. They
helped depopulate our world of gods and leprechauns and the ether, and repopulated it with
the predictively powerful entities constitutive of the modem scientific worldview. From this
pragmatic standpoint, the burden is entirely on the opponent of naturalistic scruples to tell us
why they should be suspended in some domain, despite their success elsewhere. Typically, the
only reason forthcoming is the patently question-begging reason that by suspending such
scruples we can admit that philosopher's favorite (but naturalistically suspect) properties into
our ontology!
6. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 303 n.96, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 762
n.96 (1997) ("Our case against legal principles is primarily a normative case. Legal principles
are either normatively unattractive or superfluous."). Alexander and Kress go on to claim,
however, that the reason they are making no ontological claim about legal principles is
because of their "normative character." Id. But this seems manifestly irrelevant-we can, of
course, ask about whether norms (legal, aesthetic, moral) deserve a place in our best picture
of the world. Cf Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realis, in Essays on Moral Realism
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 Phil. Rev. 163 (1986).
7. A naturalistic worldview is, of course, predicated on an epistemic nomn namely, only
believe in those entities that figure in the best explanation of experience. In that sense-but
in that sense only-we could describe the "ether" as normatively sub-optimal. But the
Alexander and Kress argument supposes that legal principles are normatively sub-optimal by
reference to non-epistemic norms.
8. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 279, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 739 (1997).
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justification is not necessarily symmetrical with prediction-the result that
ought to be reached may not be the result actually reached. This
difference should alert us to a further possibility: that the sense in which
ether explains and legal principles "explain" may not be the same, since
only the former explanation licenses a prediction.
Justification takes place within what the philosopher Wilfrid Sellars
aptly called "the space of reasons'" Explanation takes place, we might say,
within the space of causes. 9 I justify my belief that the ether analogy is
inapt by giving reasons for the claim. I explain why the window broke by
appealing to a cause: the baseball that crashed through it. Some
justifications can be explanations and vice versa. If a rational agent would
be justified in believing that P, then we can probably explain a rational
agent's belief that P in terms of the justification for P (since rational
justifications "cause" rational agents to hold beliefs). Conversely, the best
explanation for a belief that P is sometimes simply that a belief that P is
justified.
Not every explanation of a belief, of course, constitutes a justification
of that belief. That is one way of understanding what the debunking
explanations of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud have in common (and also why
such explanations are so bitterly resisted). Someone might think, for
example, that the oxymoronic "Republican revolution"' of 1994-and
the shift in "beliefs" it generated-is best explained by the congruence of
two factors: first, the increasing extent to which both major parties have
adopted the same basic economic platform, responding to the same special
interest constituency (namely, the corporations and their managerial and
ownership classes who bankroll the parties and the elections); and second,
the disproportionate share of 1994 voters drawn from these classes. But
surely it would constitute no justification of the policies promoted by Newt
Gingrich and company that their triumph is best explained by the fact that
they serve the short-term interests of the economic elite who have a
stranglehold on the political process!
But more important for our purposes is the converse proposition: not
every justification of a belief provides an explanation of it. This is one way
9. This way of putting it commits one, of course, to taking a position on the metaphysics
of explanation. It is distinctive of twentieth-century empiricist theories of explanation-the
most famous being Carl Hempel's-that they seek to account for explanation solely in terms
of its logical form, not in terms of its identification of causes. I would think most philosophers
today have been persuaded, however, that you can't distinguish genuine from pseudo-
explanations purely in terms of logical structure, and that some talk about cause is essential.
(The classic counter-examples to Hempel's empiricist account of explanation are rehearsed in
Paul Humphreys, Scientific Explanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing but the Causes,
in Scientific Explanation 300-01 (Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon eds., 1989).) Whether a
satisfactory philosophical account of causation is to be had is a larger question. For two
representative accounts-broadly, Humean/empiricist versus realist-see the classic papers by
John Mackie and David Lewis in Causation (Ernest Sosa & Michael Tooley eds., 1993).
10. "Oxymoronic" in the sense that a re-entrenchment by the status quo cannot be
revolutionary.
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of understanding the moral of the debates generated by Edmund Gettier's
famous counterexamples to the analysis of "knowledge" as "justified true
belief."" One way of explaining what Gettier showed is this: a belief can
be both justified and true, but we won't regard it as knowledge unless its
being justified figured in the genesis (that is, the explanation) of the
belief. 2 Justification, in other words, had better also be explanatory if the
resultant true belief is to count as knowledge.
Let's return to the analogy between ether and legal principles. Ether
was supposed to have figured in the causal explanation of past events, and
the prediction of future events by identifying their causes. Ether failed on
both counts. Legal principles, by contrast, explain past decisions, at least in
the sense of providing justifications for them. And thus Alexander and Kress are
correct when they say, not that legal principles enable us to predict future
decisions, but rather that they enable us "to justify conclusions about how
future cases should be decided." 3
So legal principles figure in justifications of past and future decisions,
and as such they exist in the space of reasons. The ether, by contrast, was
supposed to figure in the causal explanation of past and future events, not
their justification. But even if we accept explanatory (or causal) power as a
criterion of the real-and thus purge the ether from our best picture of
the world-this would simply have no bearing on legal principles, which
exist in the justificatory space of reasons, not the explanatory space of
causes. If this is right, then the analogy with which Alexander and Kress
begin is profoundly misconceived.
Or is it? I noted earlier the familiar point that sometimes reasons that
justify can also explain. To get legal principles into the space of causes, we
need to understand legal principles as not simply justifying past decisions
but as providing the causal explanation for these decisions: the judges
decided as they did because of legal principles (for example, because they
were "moved by" the persuasive force of those principled reasons). In that
sense, reasons would become causes and could figure in explanations. And
then the question whether legal principles are real would just be the
question: do legal principles figure in the best explanatory account of
judicial decisions?
Alexander and Kress, however, simply do not pose this question.
Happily, other writers in jurisprudence do-notably, the American Legal
Realists. Their answer to this question is surely familiar: legal principles do
not figure centrally in the best explanation of past decisions; the best
explanation of past decisions must appeal to non-legal reasons and causes
11. Edmund L. Gettier III, IsJustified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 Analysis 121 (1963). For
representative examples of the literature this paper engendered, see Alvin 1. Goldman, A
Causal Theoy of Knowing, 64J. Phil. 357 (1967) and Brian Skyrms, The Explication of "X knows
that p, "64J. Phil. 373 (1967).
12. A nice articulation of this point can be found in Philip Kitcher, The Naturalists Return,
101 Phil. Rev. 53, 60 (1992).
13. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 279, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 739 (1997).
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(for example, considerations of "fairness" and "policy," as Holmes and
Llewellyn would have it; or unconscious desires as Frank would have it). If
the Realists are right, then that might give us a real explanatory argument
against legal principles on a par with the explanatory argument against the
ether. 4 Admittedly, with the exception of Underhill Moore (whose
orthodox behaviorism drove him to eliminate the mental altogether), most
Realists did not think that legal rules and reasons played no explanatory
role in judicial decisions.' 5 But legal principles are, of course, only a
subset of the total class of legal reasons, 6 and it is possible that a
satisfactory explanation of judicial decisions might dispense at least with
them. This remains an open question. But as John Mackie remarked many
years ago-in what remains one of the most penetrating attacks on
Dworkin's jurisprudence of principles: "There is a distinction-and there
may be a divergence-between what judges say they are doing, what they
think they are doing, and the most accurate objective description of what
they actually are doing."' 7 It is precisely in the gap created by this
divergence that a real explanatory argument against legal principles might
gain a foothold: the best "objective description" of what judges are
"actually" doing might, indeed, turn out to make no reference to legal
principles, even though such a description would diverge from what judges
say they are doing. Moreover, if Mackie is right, as I suspect he is, that
"[s]uch a divergence is not even improbable,"' 8 then we may yet find
legal principles-and perhaps a jurisprudence dependent upon them like
Dworkin's-"explained away."' 9
14. I am assuming, of course, that explanatory considerations will not purge, for
examples, norms and mental states from our ontology as well.
15. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996), and also my review essay, Brian Leiter, Is There an
"American"Jurisprudence?, 17 OxfordJ. Legal St. (forthcoming 1997) (reviewing Neil Duxbury,
Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995)).
16. On the notion of a "class of legal reasons," see Brian Leiter Legal Indeterminacy, 1
Legal Theory 481 (Dec. 1995).
17. John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, reprinted in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary
Jurisprudence 161, 163 (1983).
18. Id.
19. I take up these, and related, issues in several papers: Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward
a Naturalized Jurisprudence (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Objectivity,
Morality, and Adjudication, in Objectivity in Law and Morals (Brian Leiter ed., forthcoming
1998); Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence in Analyzing Law. New Essays in Legal Theory
(Brian Bix ed., forthcoming 1998).
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